Posts Tagged ‘Security’

Human Rights Group Used to Spy on Activists

Thursday, December 22nd, 2011

By Paul Royal, Research Consultant

Amnesty International’s UK website has been compromised and is serving drive-by downloads. Historical data indicates the website AIUK was compromised on or before Friday, December 16.

Details:

Visiting hxxp://www[.]amnesty[.]org[.]uk loads hxxp://3max[.]com[.]br/cgi-bin/ai/ai.html via an iframe. 3max.com.br, which itself is a legitimate but compromised Brazilian automotive website, loads malicious Java content (stolen from the Metasploit project), which targets CVE-2011-3544. If the exploit is successful, malware is installed on the visitor’s system.

Details of Vulnerability Targeted by the Exploit
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-3544
VirusTotal Detections for Exploit
http://www.virustotal.com/file-scan/report.html?id=1cc214cee10f02d37359c0e3d04fd57899333c4b1eaa81489c74e5c2fa17c3a8-1324068153
VirusTotal Detections for Exploit Payload
http://www.virustotal.com/file-scan/report.html?id=0e53832e1c36d34a3d05c05f73ebab22a74ade95c5f3b7d9f74fad4f56d10023-1324067892

The exploit payload possesses properties of targeted malware but is being served by an exploit of a popular, public website. The working theory for this anomaly relates to Amnesty International as a human rights non-governmental organization. To explain, certain countries use zero day exploits and other techniques to gain electronic information about the activities of human rights activists. Of course, a subset of these activists are too smart to click on links in even well-worded spearphishing emails. But what if you compromised a website frequented by these activists (e.g., Amnesty International)? Then your targets come to you. The context-specific damage potential is significant.

Amnesty International UK has been notified about the compromise.

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Malformed DHCPv6 packets cause RPC to become unresponsive

Tuesday, August 16th, 2011

by Thomas Unterleitner

There is a vulnerability in the part of RPC processing DHCPv6. The failure results because of incorrect handling of malformed messages. On July 28, 2011, this vulnerability was confirmed and reported by Microsoft.

To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need to intercept DHCPv6 traffic. Once a DHCPv6 Request has been intercepted, the corresponding Reply would have to be modified to contain the malformed Domain Search List option. On reception of this malformed packet, RPC on the remote machine would fail. Exploiting this vulnerability would cause the RPC service to fail, losing any RPC-based services, as well as the potential loss of some COM functions.

Failing RPC calls might interfere with the following:

- network connectivity (no IP address acquired, no IP address release/renew, …)

- applications using COM/DCOM interfaces

- machine’s sound system
The error has been found to occur on reception of DHCPv6 Reply (message type 7) packets, containing the option “Domain Search List” (option type 24) with an empty domain.

Affected Systems

Using the sample DHCPv6, it was possible to verify this issue on the following operating systems and configurations:

*       Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 32 bit & 64 bit
It is very likely that other versions of Windows 7 (and maybe earlier) are affected by this issue.

Impact

1.      Reception of a “malformed” DHCPv6 Reply packet causes critical error 0xc0000374 within rpcrt4, leaving the RPC server to become unavailable.

a.) ipconfig /release <adapter_name> reporting: An error occurred while releasing interface <adapter_name>: The RPC server is unavailable.

This enables e.g. rouge DHCP servers to prevent other machines from connecting to a network.

Acknowledgments

This vulnerability was discovered by Michael Burgbacher and Thomas Unterleitner on behalf of Barracuda Networks AG. The complete advisory is available here.

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Google+ Gets a “+1″ for Browser Security

Thursday, July 21st, 2011

by Ray Kelly, Manager of Client Side Technologies

 

+1Launching a new Web app today comes with a few certainties, and one of them is, “I will be a target for hackers” for sure.  So when an app as large and as high profile as Google+ launches, it will surely be one of the top targets for malicious activity.  This happened to Facebook the more popular it grew and it still is a favorite platform for malicious activity.  I did some analysis of the HTTP traffic between Google+ and the browser and found that Google is off to a good start in regards to browser security. Below are several take-aways:

Only SSL!
All Google+ traffic is sent over SSL and non SSL is not even an option.  This protects users’ traffic from getting sniffed and their sessions from being hijacked.  It is good to know that Google understands that sensitive information is being shared and SSL is really the only option for transmitting data.

Secure Headers
Here is what a typical response looks like from Google+:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 184942
Set-Cookie: ULS=somehash; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 14:29:05 GMT
Expires: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 14:29:05 GMT
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
Server: GSE

There are a few headers in this response that are specific to browser security, for example:

Set-Cookie Secure – This tells the browser to only send cookies over a secure (SSL) connection.  So if the site happens to hit a page that is not SSL, then the cookie will not be sent.

Set-Cookie HttpOnly – This prevents the cookie from being accessed by client side script.

Both of these cookie attributes help to prevent  session hijacking by only sending cookies when appropriate.

X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff – This prevents “mime” based attacks. The header instructs the browser not to override the response content type.  For example, some browsers try to be smart by deciding for themselves if the content is really is text/html or an image.  So with the nosniff option, if the server says the content is text/html, then the browser needs to render it as text/html.

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN – This tells the browser to only render frame pages from the URL hosting the main page.  This prevents Clickjacking attacks against the user.  Clickjacking is a browser-based attack that tricks the user into clicking on one thing but then performs a different action, such as following a user on Twitter.

X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block – This allows the browser to detect a cross site reflection attack.  If the browser sees a potential reflection attack, it will prevent the page from rendering in the browser.  Instead, you will see something similar to this depending on the browser:

 

What about Facebook?
While these preventions are by no means ground breaking or new, the fact that Google is thinking about and using them is a good step.  In contrast, let’s look at a typical Facebook response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: public, max-age=604800
Content-Type: application/x-javascript; charset=utf-8
Expires: Fri, 22 Jul 2011 14:46:37 GMT
P3P: CP="Facebook does not have a P3P policy. Learn why here: http://fb.me/p3p"
X-Frame-Options: DENY
Set-Cookie: _e_syaN_0=deleted; expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT; path=/; domain=.facebook.com; httponly
X-FB-Server: 10.52.238.45
X-Cnection: close
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 14:46:37 GMT
Content-Length: 24032

It is surprising that Facebook has not taken the same simple precautions that Google+ has taken. Here, we can see the differences:

Secure Cookie Nosniff XSS Protection X-Frame HttpOnly Cookie SSL
Google+ Yes Yes Yes Sameorigin Yes Yes
Facebook No No No Deny Yes Optional and not default

In fact, just yesterday Microsoft’s Vulnerability Research team released advisory MSVR11-007: “Clickjacking Vulnerability in Facebook.com Could Allow Account Compromise”.   According to the advisory, Facebook has resolved the issue.  I did another check of the headers and still did not see any change to the response.  It is possible that Facebook closed the hole on the server side with input validation in order to prevent the malicious data from entering their database, but they still did not implement the simple browser precautions that Google+ has.   Here is the link to the official MSVR advisory:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/msvr11-007.mspx

The folks from SecTheory/WhiteHat Security have an excellent write-up on Clickjacking.  For detailed information on this vulnerability visit:
http://www.sectheory.com/clickjacking.htm

 

Conclusion
Unfortunately, not all of these headers are supported in all browsers, meaning any of you still using IE6 won’t be able to take advantage of these headers.  What’s this mean for you? Make sure you are using an up-to-date browser to take full advantage of these protections.

Do these security measures make Google+ impervious to malicious activities?  Absolutely not.  Is it a good start?  Yes, it is. And further, it is good to see an app make its debut with security in mind.  It actually gives us Infosec folks a bit of hope that developers are listening and doing the right thing.

 

 

 

 

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DoSing the security community with a ToS

Wednesday, July 6th, 2011

by Daniel Peck, Research Scientist

The security community echo chamber was rocking hard over the weekend with news of an online backup/sharing service, Dropbox, changing its Terms of Service to grant them “worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable rights to…” do basically anything they want with your content.  From Dropbox’s point of view, this is the sort of thing that they claim they need to have in order to provide you the service. That may or may not be true, but it was probably something their legal counsel told them that it would be in their best interest to include.

The odd part is that anyone in the security community was surprised by this. It does not matter what the ToS said. Fact of the matter is that if you are uploading information to a third-party that is not in an encrypted form that you control, then it needs to be considered public. The only question at that point is the length of time before everyone else knows its public.  Someone who isn’t you can read it and you’re putting your trust in them not to reveal it, share it, or profit from it. In practice this may mean that your information is never revealed or that it is revealed when someone compromises their service, or it may mean when they decide to change their ToS, which every ToS tends to allow the provider to do without much notice and little, if any, recourse.

Too many of us have forgotten, or never learned, that everything on the interwebs is public by default, unless you’re making a real effort to restrict access. Ultimately, there are just gradients of how public that information actually is. Dropbox and similar services are great for what they are, a convenient place to put slides and other random files that you want to be able to access or share easily and don’t mind if someone else sees if they put a little effort into doing so.  Essentially, it is an alternative to sending email with attachment, and it has about the same amount of (in)security.

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Spam targeting tax professionals automatically installs malware

Wednesday, June 29th, 2011

by David Michmerhuizen & Luis Chapetti – security researchers

 

Tax forum spam

 

The criminal gangs that distribute the password stealing Trojan.Zeus have altered their spam campaigns in a frightening new direction.  Already seen targeting their emails at credit point-of-sale users and wire transfer users, their latest spams are now crafted to appeal to tax preparation professionals by posing as an official IRS communication.  What’s even worse is that their payload isn’t an attachment or a link to a download. Rather, the payload is a link to a Web site hosting an exploit kit that probes your computer’s software and automatically installs the Zeus password stealer.

The messages don’t give you much to be suspicious about at first.  They come from a generic looking name and use the email-id of the recipient as the subject.

Tax Forum Spam

Tax Forum Spam

The text itself is very well written, as well it should be.  It is an almost exact cut and paste of an IRS announcement from 2004.  To be precise,  IR-2004-67.

The item to examine closely is the link embedded near the bottom of the message.  Although it says irs.gov, this link actually points to a set of malicious domains with vaguely official sounding names.  In this case it’s irsgovnews.com  (warning: do not visit that domain in your Web browser!)

The job of these domains is to send Javascript to your browser to accomplish two things.  First it displays a pop-up message saying that your browser cannot reach the site.

Fake alert

 

…which is not true.  The alert comes from the site itself!  This is to keep you from suspecting what comes next.

What comes next is that the Javascript directs the browser off to another domain that hosts the Blackhole exploit kit.  This kit sends specially crafted messages to the browser that try to take advantage of unpatched weaknesses in browser helpers such as Java or Windows Media Player.

If any weakness is found then Zeus is downloaded and installed automatically behind the scenes.

Exploit and Zeus network traffic

Exploit and Zeus network traffic

Previous spam efforts required you to click “Run” in order to install the malware payload.  The use of an exploit kit in this case means that Zeus is installed without user interaction.   Once you click the link in the email, it’s game over.

Barracuda Networks customers using the Barracuda Spam & Virus Firewall are protected from these emails, while customers using Barracuda Web Filters or Barracuda Web Security Flex are protected from the payload.

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Huge amounts of Federal Reserve spam delivering Zeus password stealer

Tuesday, June 21st, 2011

by David Michmerhuizen & Luis Chapetti – Security Researchers

Our spam monitoring systems at Barracuda Labs are following a very large spam campaign carrying Trojan.Zeus.   The spam amounts are approaching many hundreds of thousands a day and although they are being delivered to a wide cross-section of Internet users, the content of the spams is aimed at users of online banking services.

When spam delivers malware, one of the most common strains it carries is the password-stealing Zeus Trojan.  Zeus specifically targets banking passwords, and the gangs that distribute variants of this malware are especially interested in banking credentials belonging to small businesses and government agencies.  Compared to the average consumer, these entities often have more money in their accounts and set higher limits on wire transfers.   One thing small organizations don’t always realize is that they do not enjoy the same protections against fraudulent transactions that consumers do.

The spams use graphics hosted by the Federal Reserve and pose as notices of a failed wire transfer:

Fake wire transfer spam

Fake wire transfer spam

Much like last weeks Chase Paymentech spam campaign, these notices are of particular interest to financial professionals.  Unlike the more sophisticated Chase emails, these are a simple affair with poorly constructed text and no attempt at hiding the executable nature of the linked payload.

Still, there’s the possibility that a busy executive might just skim the spam and click on the attachment, resulting in a Windows security warning:

Windows security warning

Windows security warning

While the spammers try to hide behind a double extension of .pdf.exe, this is no PDF.  This is an executable program, and the Federal Reserve is not going to send you any vital information coded into a program.   Don’t run it.

If you do, you’ve installed Zeus:

Zeus network traffic

Zeus network traffic

It will run quietly in the background, intercepting browser traffic, watching for credentials and sending any it finds off to its command and control server.

Barracuda Networks customers using the Barracuda Spam & Virus Firewall are protected from these emails, while customers using Barracuda Web Filters or Barracuda Web Security Flex are protected from the payload.

 

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Fake Chase Bank invite delivers password stealer

Friday, June 17th, 2011

by David Michmerhuizen & Luis Chapetti – Security Researchers

Chase Paymentech logo

The spam monitoring systems at Barracuda Labs have uncovered an especially objectionable spam campaign that poses as a sign-up email from the Chase Bank credit card processing service Chase Paymentech.

We see lots and lots of spam at Barracuda Labs.  Even if the sender isn’t suspect, it is still generally easy to spot either because of the subject matter or flaws in the content.

What makes this spam dangerous is a combination of convincing content and deceptive payload.  Examining this spam highlights the risk that comes with assuming one can always judge spam by its appearance alone.

These spams are particularly well done.  The only suspicious element is that the From: address is not Chase bank, an unusual failure given how easy it is to fake the From: field in an email.

Chase Paymentech spam
Fake Chase Paymentech email

The email invites you to activate a credit card payment account and tells you that your first step is to find your merchant ID and user ID in the attached Microsoft Word document.   That Word document is what indirectly delivers the malware payload.

Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Word have mostly been patched or mitigated, and it’s been years since Word document attachments were something most users had to worry about. While users have become more suspicious of programs that must be downloaded and run, they’re more likely to open a document which is “just something you read.”

Unfortunately, malware distributors have recently discovered that common vulnerabilities in Adobe’s Flash player can be exploited by embedding the malicious Flash file into a Word document.  This takes users who aren’t likely to suspect a Word document of malicious intent and puts them at risk if they open it.

That’s what happens here.  If you open the attached merchant_info.doc, you can’t see the Flash control embedded in the document.  You really don’t see much of anything for the minute or two that it takes the Flash code to download and install malware on your Windows computer.

Word document
Word document

Once the infection is accomplished, this Word document closes and you’re back to staring at the email and wondering what went wrong.   Meanwhile your computer is running Trojan.Zeus in the background.

Trojan.Zeus network traffic
Trojan.Zeus network traffic

Zeus quietly monitors your Internet traffic looking for username and password data.  It saves them and periodically sends them off to control servers elsewhere on the Internet.

The content of this spam is of particular interest to financial professionals, making the installation of a password stealer that much worse.  Trojan.Zeus has been implicated in many instances of online theft from small business accounts, especially since small business banking involves higher dollar amounts and does not carry the same level of theft protection as consumer accounts do.

The Adobe vulnerabilities that allow this to succeed have been used in a number of recent email attacks.  We strongly recommend you upgrade all of your Flash installations by visiting http://get.adobe.com/flashplayer.

Barracuda Networks customers using the Barracuda Spam & Virus Firewall are protected from these emails, while customers using Barracuda Web Filters or Barracuda Web Security Flex are protected from the payload.

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Spammers Offer iPhone 5, Deliver Malware

Monday, May 23rd, 2011

by Dave Michmerhuizen – Security Researcher

 

The iPhone 5 isn’t due to be released until fall, or even Christmas, but the spam honeypots at Barracuda Labs are already detecting malicious messages targeting anxious Apple acolytes.

Fake Phone

Fake Phone

The image of a beautiful see-through phone is actually a concept photo that is over two years old.

All of the links in the email lead to a copy of Trojan.Zapchast, an IRC-controlled backdoor.

Fake iPhone spam

Fake iPhone spam

Naturally the apple.com from: address is spoofed.

If you do click on one of the links and run the offered executable, another old iPhone concept photo is displayed in order to distract you from the installation of the backdoor.

Photo distracts you from backdoor installation

Photo distracts you from backdoor installation

 

In this case, if you’re curious about iPhone products, visit the Apple iPhone pages at http://www.apple.com/iphone. And never click on links in emails, especially from unknown sources.

Barracuda Networks customers using the Barracuda Spam & Virus Firewall are protected from these emails.

 

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Fake AntiVirus Scams Add MacOS Support

Thursday, May 19th, 2011

by Luis Chapetti & Dave Michmerhuizen – Security Researchers

Fake antivirus scams are designed to scare innocent computer users with exaggerated displays of virus activity in the hope that they will hand over their credit card numbers to make it go away.   They’ve been around for years and the most prevalent ones use a freely available JavaScript design that mimics the Windows user interface, as seen here:

Fake Antivirus that mimics Windows

Fake Antivirus that mimics Windows

 

When these pages pop up on Macintosh computers, it’s immediately obvious that something isn’t right.

Last quarter, Apple set a new record (3.47 million sold in the quarter) with a growth rate of 33% over the prior year’s quarter.  Apple has about 10% of the computer market in the United States, and that doesn’t even include iPads.

That market share has been noticed by the fake antivirus scammers, and this week they have added a new JavaScript design that mimics the Macintosh interface, as seen here:

Fake antivirus that mimics Macintosh

Fake antivirus that mimics Macintosh

 

Drive-by download sites now serve up this page if they detect access from a MacOS computer while Windows users still see a Windows style page.   The example above is called “Apple Security Center” but similar templates have been seen named MacDefender.

Since this is just JavaScript, the correct move at this point is to refuse the download and browse elsewhere.  Accepting the download and running it installs “Mac Protector” which displays pornographic images and promises to remove them for a credit card payment.

The initial infection vector is poisoned entries in Google search results.  We’ve talked extensively about poisoned search results and this represents another example of where otherwise normal Web sites are compromised and made to serve up bogus pages that are well ranked by Google. When one of these links is clicked, the compromised Web site detects a visit from Google search results and sends the visitor to a server that presents the fake antivirus. The recent change in Google content ranking has not stymied these attacks – the malicious link we tested was on page 1 of our search results:

Malicious link in Google results

Malicious link in Google results

 

Past Search Engine Optimization campaigns targeted very popular search terms such as celebrity sightings or breaking news events.  The poisoned links mentioned in this post are more likely to show up in the results for more mundane search terms so as to attract less attention, but they’re still getting plenty of traffic.

This is turning out to be a big problem for Apple. It has been conventional wisdom for years that one of the simplest Internet security solutions is to “just buy a Mac” and stop worrying.  Now that the most common drive-by attack vectors are serving up malware, unwary Mac users are being exposed to the harsh world that Windows users have dealt with for years, and are going to have to learn the same lessons.  Don’t believe everything that pops up on your screen, and don’t run any software unless you know where it came from and what it will do.

Barracuda Networks Barracuda Web Filters and the Barracuda Web Security Flex stop the download of this threat.

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Learning the Importance of WAF Technology – the Hard Way

Monday, April 11th, 2011

Posted by:  Michael Perone, EVP & CMO

Wow.  What a weekend.  In case you haven’t heard, Barracuda Networks was the latest victim of a SQL injection attack on our corporate Web site that compromised lead and partner contact information.  The good news is the information compromised was essentially just names and email addresses, and no financial information is even stored in those databases. Further, we have confirmed that some of the affected databases contained one-way cryptographic hashes of salted passwords.  However, all active passwords for applications in use remain secure.

So, the bad news is that we made a mistake.  The Barracuda Web Application Firewall in front of the Barracuda Networks Web site was unintentionally placed in passive monitoring mode and was offline through a maintenance window that started Friday night (April 8 ) after close of business Pacific time.  Starting Saturday night at approximately 5pm Pacific time, an automated script began crawling our Web site in search of unvalidated parameters.  After approximately two hours of nonstop attempts, the script discovered a SQL injection vulnerability in a simple PHP script that serves up customer reference case studies by vertical market.  As with many ancillary scripts common to Web sites, this customer case study database shared the SQL database used for marketing programs which contained names and email addresses of leads, channel partners and some Barracuda Networks employees.  The attack utilized one IP address initially to do reconnaissance and was joined by another IP address about three hours later.  We have logs of all the attack activity, and we believe we now fully understand the scope of the attack.

This latest incident brings home some key reminders for us, including that:

  • You can’t leave a Web site exposed nowadays for even a day (or less)
  • Code vulnerabilities can happen in places far away from the data you’re trying to protect
  • You can’t be complacent about coding practices, operations or even the lack of private data on your site – even when you have WAF technology deployed

Before responding prematurely to the press or to anyone else, we wanted to make sure we had time to sift through our logs and do a bit of communication.  We’re glad that the impact will be very minimal, but we’re not happy about the amount of bandwidth we’ve spent assessing what happened, responding to affected parties and putting in place the steps to prevent it in the future.

We are working to notify everyone whose email addresses were exposed, and we apologize for the inconvenience.

 

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